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Abstract 
 
We construct decadal estimates of GDP per capita for the colonies and states of the Mid Atlantic 
region between 1720 and 1800.  They show that the region likely achieved modest improvements 
in per capita GDP over this period despite a number of demographic factors that tended to slow 
the pace of growth.  Nonetheless the rate of growth we find is below that commonly assumed to 
have prevailed in eighteenth century North America and calls those estimates into question.  The 
striking feature of the region’s economy in the eighteenth century was not rising living-
standards, but its ability to achieve rapid extensive growth without a decline in living standards.  
To contemporaries this extensive growth and short-term volatility in incomes must have been 
much more visible than any trend improvement in overall well-being. 
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Economic Growth in the Mid Atlantic Region: 
Conjectural Estimates for 1720 to 1800 
 
 
 Understanding when and how modern economic growth, characterized by sustained 
improvements in per capita income, began remains one of the central concerns of economic 
history.  In Western Europe and North America, the transition to modern economic growth was 
clearly underway by the early nineteenth century.  It remains difficult, however, to be much more 
precise about the timing of the transition without better estimates of aggregate economic growth 
in the eighteenth century.1  In recent years considerable progress has been made in leveraging 
new data and new perspectives to illuminate the long-run performance of the English economy, 
although how to interpret these data remains in dispute (see, e.g., Clark 2013 and Broadberry, et 
al 2013).2  In contrast, relatively little attention has been given in recent years to refining our 
understanding of the performance of the American economy prior to 1800, and there is 
considerable variation (as we document below) in the prevailing views about this period.  While 
it is tempting to seek a single set of estimates for all of the territories that became the United 
States after 1776, the varied nature of regional economies and the limited scope of economic 
integration across regions suggest that it may be more useful to build such estimates region by 
region.3   
                                                
1 As Leunig (2013, p. 1) writes: “Discovering what has happened to national income over the very long 
run is an extremely important issue in economic history.  It is the essential first step to understanding why 
and how modern economic growth emerged 
2  Improving on estimates of pre-1820 economic growth is a central objective of the recently announced 
Maddison Project (Bolt and van Zanden 2013). 
3   Lindert and Williamson (2013) also take a regional approach in building up estimates of aggregate 
output for the period 1774-1840, distinguishing three regions, New England, the Mid Atlantic and the 
South Atlantic.   Whereas we have constructed our estimates from the product side, they built up their 
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 In what follows we offer new estimates of the aggregate performance of the Middle 
Atlantic region (modern-day New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey) between 
1720 and 1800.4  In contrast to the most widely accepted estimates, which suggest that the region 
and all of what became the United States experienced sustained improvements in material living 
standards over the course of the eighteenth century, we demonstrate that there was relatively 
little long-run improvement prior to 1800, and that any such progress was likely dwarfed by 
shorter-run instability in income.  While this finding implies that the onset of modern economic 
growth in this region of North America did not occur prior to 1800, it also emphasizes the 
comparatively high standard of living that was enjoyed on average by its residents in the 
eighteenth century, and the striking ability of the regional economy to sustain this standard of 
living while undergoing very rapid extensive growth.5 
 Considerable evidence supports the view that residents in all regions of eighteenth-
century British North America enjoyed a high standard of living, and this prosperity attracted 
continuing streams of immigrants, encouraged a high birth rate, and fostered investment in slave 
and indentured labor; all of which combined to generate one of the highest rates of growth of 
population in the world at the time.  Abundant land forestalled diminishing returns so that the 
high rate of population growth was also transformed into a high rate of growth of gross domestic 
product and its components, including exports.  The levels of wealth achieved by some free 
                                                                                                                                                       
estimates from the income side, relying largely on the work of Donald Adams and Jackson Main for 
estimating labor incomes, and Alice Hanson Jones’s estimates of wealth for property incomes. 
4  We use the regional definition followed by most colonial historians and include Delaware because it 
was part of New Jersey during the colonial period.  The current Census definition would put it in the 
South Atlantic region. 
5  Smith (1981) makes clear that not everyone enjoyed this relatively high standard of living. 
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colonists were high and had increased over the colonial period.6  As John McCusker (2006, p. 
630) put it in his survey of colonial statistics, “On the eve of the American Revolution, real per 
capita gross domestic product in the Thirteen Continental Colonies was: … higher than any other 
nation in the world at the time.”7  
In contrast to the consensus that exists about the favorable standard of living in the 
colonies and about aggregate growth, there is considerably less agreement about the rate of 
growth of living standards and per capita GDP.  Despite McCusker’s assertion “that its economy 
grew at the fastest rate of all known contemporary economies,” scholars remain divided about 
the actual rate of economic growth as illustrated in the range of estimated growth rates reported 
in Table 1. Most of the estimates for the mainland Anglo-American colonies as a whole fall 
between 0.3 percent and 0.6 percent per year, but scholars have placed the rate of growth of real 
GDP per capita anywhere between 0.05 to 1.0 percent per year. 8  The lower rate implies that 
however successful the economy might appear to have been, it was a static prosperity.  The 
higher rate means that the colonial economy performed on average - over a very long period of 
                                                
6  Evidence on heights of free males born in the colonies also reflects economic prosperity, manifest 
especially in a good diet, and a hospitable environment, with the result that the average heights of males 
born in America equaled or exceeded that of their British counterparts for the entire century, even though  
they did not increase much over time. (Komlos, 2001, Table 4; Steckel 2006, Series Bd653). 
7  He also alleged that it was “higher by far than it had been a century or a century and a half earlier,” the 
result of his having assumed a “long-term rate of growth [that] exceeded, perhaps even doubled, the rate 
of growth of Great Britain.” 
8   McCusker (2000, p. 156, Tables 1 and 2, and accompanying text) argued that the weight of opinion 
would narrow this range to between 0.3 and 0.6 percent per year.  For an earlier argument in favor of this 
range, see also McCusker and Menard (1984, pp. 52-57)  where they argued that the lower bound of 
colonial growth was established by estimates (at the time) of the rate of growth in England, while the 
higher rate reflected their view that because the colonies had started out far behind they likely grew faster 
than the mother country. McCusker  (2000, p. 5) reaffirmed the view that “the long term rate of growth 
exceeded, perhaps even doubled, the rate of growth of Great Britain.”  
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time – as well as or better than the U.S. economy performed in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, an age which witnessed the industrialization of the northeast, the expansion of railroads 
and canals, and more broadly the acceleration of economic growth to modern rates.  It is also 
important to note, that since the estimated level of GDP per capita in 1800 is widely accepted 
(see Table 2 below; Lindert and Williamson, 2011, Table 6; and McCusker, 2000, Table 2), the 
more rapid the rate of growth supposed to have prevailed in the preceding decades, the lower the 
standard of living must have been at the beginning of the period.   
The range of rates is even more pronounced for individual colonies and regions reported 
in the bottom half of Table 1, ranging from minus 0.8 percent per year for New England from 
1700-09 to 1770-79 to 1.6 percent per year for Pennsylvania between 1730 and 1770.  Lindert 
and Williamson (2011, Table 6) report an equally broad range of growth rates across regions for 
the period 1774 to 1800.  A range of opinion on the speed of economic growth is to be expected 
given the divergent nature of the economies of the various colonial regions and the relative 
paucity of quantifiable data for the period, but some of the variation may reflect the methods of 
estimation.   In the absence of comprehensive statistics, past efforts to measure colonial 
economic performance have relied on the behavior of what each individual researcher thought of 
as either the key economic variable or what they were able to measure, thus ignoring some 
possible countervailing influences.9  
 Refining our understanding of the dynamics of economic growth in North America 
before 1800 requires moving beyond estimates based on a single variable or the impressionistic 
combination of several key indicators.  A more systematic approach to integrating the available 
                                                
9 Alice Hanson Jones (1980), for example, used changes in wealth and an assumption about the likely 
ratio of wealth to income to estimate GDP. Marc Egnal (1998, Table 3.6, p. 43) explained that to arrive at 
his estimates “initial approximations were derived from data on per capita imports.” 
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data is needed, and the method of controlled conjectures provides exactly this. Exports, which 
comprised roughly 6-8 percent of the economy, are only a part of the conjectural estimates rather 
than serving as a proxy for the entire economy’s performance.  Likewise our approach takes into 
account the influence of increased wealth, 60 percent of which in the Mid Atlantic was the value 
of real estate.  In other words, this method allows us to produce estimates of GDP per capita that 
are consistent with all of the available evidence, while making explicit the assumptions we use in 
assembling these different components. And, importantly, this method allows us to assess the 
consistency of other estimates with the available evidence. 
The initial application of the conjectural method to the colonies as a whole by Mancall 
and Weiss (1999) suggested that the rate of growth of per capita GDP was substantially slower 
than had been commonly accepted. Such a result for all the colonies need not, however, reflect 
the performance in any specific region, especially given the extraordinary divergence in the 
economic systems of the mainland British colonies.  Growth rates for New England, which had 
no large-scale staple exports, might have differed dramatically from the rates in plantation 
regions of the Chesapeake colonies or the Lower South, or even the grain-exporting sectors of 
the middle colonies.  Moreover the evidence available varies from region to region. Thus, more 
precise estimates of growth rates during the colonial period need to come from analysis of 
specific regions.   
Here we employ the conjectural approach to develop estimates of the growth of GDP per 
capita for the colonies and states of the mid-Atlantic—modern-day New York, Pennsylvania, 
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Delaware, and New Jersey .10  Our earlier analysis of the economy of the Lower South (Mancall, 
Rosenbloom and Weiss 2003) revealed that the region, despite its extensive rice and indigo 
exports, had a poor record of intensive economic growth.  Exports and output (i.e. real GDP) 
grew quite rapidly, but so too did population, with the result that output per person at the end of 
the colonial period, as well as at the end of the century, was virtually the same as it had been in 
1720 – around $59-60 (in 1840 prices).  The region experienced some very modest growth 
between 1740 and 1770, but that could not offset periodic declines in GDP per capita before 
1740 and after 1770. 11 
 Until now, there has been no similar analysis of the middle colonies, though a number of 
previous histories have speculated about the region’s economic performance, arguing that it 
experienced sustained growth with trade as the driving factor for regional economic fortunes.12  
Summing up much of the scholarship about this region, McCusker and Menard (1984, p. 202) 
concluded that “commencing in the 1720s, a long, powerful, sustained expansion characterized 
the remainder of the colonial period, with perhaps some (but not much) tailing off after 1760.”13  
Marc Egnal (1998, p. 46), though differing in some details, also offered a sanguine assessment of 
                                                
10  We use the regional definition followed by most colonial historians and include Delaware because it 
was part of New Jersey during the colonial period.  The current Census definition would put it in the 
South Atlantic region. 
11  The absence of growth in per capita output in the Lower South reflects to a large extent the changes in 
the composition of the population, namely a rise in the share of the female and child shares of the 
population, and after 1770 a decline in the slave share of the population, all of which served to reduce the 
labor force participation rate.   
12 In some sense, the field has not evolved substantially—at least not in terms of precise quantifiable 
estimates, for the past thirty years—since the time when Greenberg (1979, pp. 410-11), suggested that 
“economic growth and the social change and dislocation that often accompanied it occurred, in the main, 
more rapidly in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania than elsewhere in North America during the 
colonial period.”  
13 McCusker (1972, p. 155, fn 17) argued that economic growth in Pennsylvania proceeded at the 
astonishing rate of 1.6 percent per year between 1730 and 1770. 
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the region’s growth, noting that while the pace of development was uneven, “[s]olid long-term 
growth marked the northern colonies in the eighteenth century.” 
Presumably, results for this region would differ from the Lower South, at least in part 
because the Middle Atlantic’s exports of grains figured less prominently in the regional economy 
than did the Lower South’s staple exports of rice and indigo.  Further, though there were slaves 
in the middle colonies, they constituted a far smaller and declining share of the overall 
population, most likely because farmers involved in cereal cultivation did not have year-round 
demand for labor (Berlin, 1980).  Instead, the family or tenant farm dominated the regional 
production of wheat and corn.  While the majority of these agricultural products were consumed 
locally, nonetheless the region exported a considerable quantity of these grains, primarily to the 
West Indies and Southern Europe.  Yet, to determine what actually happened, we must look at 
the available evidence. 
Our estimates reveal a modest upward trend in regional per capita income between 1720 
and 1800 along with substantial short-run fluctuations. In the half-century preceding American 
independence, per capita income increased at an average annual rate of about 0.13 percent per 
year.  But that long-run average increase was dwarfed by short-run swings in income.  During 
the 1750s, for example, the stimulus provided by the French and Indian War contributed to a 
nearly 8 percent increase in per capita income, but the dislocations that followed when it ended 
wiped out almost all of those gains.  And incomes fell sharply in the wake of the American 
Revolution, before staging a substantial comeback in the 1790s which reflected the boom in the 
export and re-export trade.  These figures suggest that to contemporaries the dominant fact of the 
aggregate economy must have been its short-run volatility rather than any trend toward sustained 
improvement in living standards.  They also suggest, consistent with new work by Lindert and 
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Williamson (2011), that the Revolution produced a substantial drop in American incomes that 
persisted until the early 1790s. 
 
Using Controlled Conjectures 
 Our estimates of per capita GDP growth for the states and colonies of the middle Atlantic 
region are derived using the conjectural estimating equation pioneered by Kuznets (1952), 
popularized by David (1967), and modified by Weiss (1994). Output per person (GDP/P) in any 
year equals the product of the labor force participation rate (LF/P) and average (non-shelter) 
output per worker (GDP/LF), plus an estimate of the rental value of dwellings.14  Output per 
worker can, in turn, be written as a weighted average of output per worker in agriculture (a) and 
nonagriculture (n), where the weights are each sector's share of the labor force.  Thus the basic 
estimating equation can be written as:. 
 GDP/P = (LF/P) [Sa (O/LF)a + S n (O/LF)n]  + (Os/ P)                   (1) 
Because Sn = (1 - Sa), the equation can be further simplified to: 
 GDP/P = (LF/P) [Sa (O/LF)a + (1 -  Sa ) (O/LF)n] + (Os/ P) .   (2) 
As equation (2) makes clear the value of per capita GDP in any year can be computed with data 
for just five economic variables: the labor force participation rate, average labor productivity in 
agriculture, average labor productivity in nonagriculture, the agricultural share of the labor force, 
and the rental value of dwellings.  Of course, we do not have data for all five of these variables, 
so we must estimate some of them, as we detail below.  
                                                
14  While the stock of dwellings would have been produced by labor, the annual flow of shelter services 
was produced by the housing stock.  Thus we treat this service flow independently from the bulk of 
output produced by labor so that it does not bias changes in the output per worker values in either 
agriculture or nonagriculture.  See Weiss  (1994, Table 5) for evidence on the bias that was involved in 
the period from  1840-60.  
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 Our estimation procedure proceeds backward in time: the estimated level of each series in 
the base year 1800 is projected backwards on the basis of the available evidence and plausible 
conjectures.15  We proceed as if the base year figures are known values, even though they are not 
known with the precision or completeness of official statistics.  Rather, they are estimates taken 
from the work of others and were not generated by our conjectures.16  In any case, these are the  
values that we extrapolate backward on the basis of the change in the conjectural index.  The 
base-year values of output per capita and its components for the region are summarized in Table 
2 and compared to values for the nation as a whole. 
To obtain estimates of per capita GDP for years before 1800 we constructed a time series 
for each of the variables that make up the conjectural estimating equation.   Three of the series 
could be constructed in a fairly straightforward manner because there exists time series evidence 
for key items that underlay that series (e.g. population and its composition, which form the basis 
of the labor force estimates) or that could serve as a proxy for the desired series (e.g. change in 
the value of structures to represent change in the value of dwellings that yielded the annual flow 
of shelter services).  Discussion of those series is confined to the table notes and the online 
appendix to this paper.  Here we discuss the two series, output per worker in agriculture and in 
nonagriculture, that required more effort to construct and are the most important influences on 
the economy’s rate of growth.  Three pieces of information or assumptions lie behind these 
                                                
15  We use the 1800 figures as our benchmark so that our estimates link up with GDP series for the 
nineteenth century, and because we think the 1800 estimate is more reliable than estimates for earlier 
years.   
16  The GDP per capita figures in 1800 for the region were based on the national estimates by Weiss, 
(1992, Table 1.4).  David’s (1967) estimates for 1800 are lower than Weiss's and thus dictate less 
potential for growth in the preceding century.  In both cases, the figures were conjectured in ways that 
leave the 1800 figures unbiased by business-cycle influences.  Lindert and Williamson’s (2013, Table 6) 
recent work puts gross income per capita for the nation at $59, about equal to David’s estimate. 
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important series: the rate of change in the value of the diet (which is the dominant factor in 
determining the rate of growth of agricultural output and thus agricultural output per worker); the 
assumption that changes in real wages of urban workers can approximate changes in 
nonagricultural output per worker; and the rate of change of participation in the rural agricultural 
labor force.  
   
Estimation of Agricultural Output 
Measuring agricultural output is essential to constructing plausible estimates of the rate of 
growth of per capita GDP before 1800 because agriculture was the dominant component of the 
economy.  At the end of the century, agricultural output comprised 41 percent of the region’s 
GDP and 45 percent of non-shelter output (Table 2).  No time series of the region’s agricultural 
output is available for the eighteenth century, but we were able to construct one in fairly direct 
fashion.  The output of the agricultural sector is comprised of food that was produced and 
consumed within the region (f) and those agricultural products that were exported either abroad 
(xa) or to other colonies (xo).17   
 
OA = f  + xa  + xo  
 
                                                
17  We treat all this agricultural output as though it were marketed in order to place a value on it and to 
make our estimates comparable in scope to those for the early part of the nineteenth century.  We have not 
made estimates of the value of home manufacturing and farm improvements in each year, but the value of 
some of that production is implicitly included in our estimates to the extent that such production had 
become part of the marketed output in the benchmark year of 1800.  In other words, the level of our GDP 
series includes some of this output, but changes in these items over time do not have an impact on the rate 
of growth.  Because these items were likely more important in 1720 than in 1770 or 1800, the inclusion of 
a time series of such output would raise the level of GDP in all years, but more so in 1720, and would 
thus bias downward the estimated rate of economic growth. 
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Food produced for domestic consumption within the region (f) was the largest component 
of agricultural output in the colonies.  Because of its importance we describe the estimation here 
in some detail, and in greater detail in the online appendix to this paper.  We have compiled a 
new and more complete time series on agricultural exports from the region, both to foreign 
markets (xa) as well as to other North American colonies (xc), both of which are described in a 
separate publication and the online appendix to this paper.18  
We estimated food produced for domestic consumption within the region (f) as the 
difference between the value of food consumed (c) and the value of food imported into the 
region from abroad (fm) as well as from other North American colonies (fo).  In other words, 
 f  =  fc  -  fm    -  fo  
There is no time-series evidence on consumption, but by using the available information about 
the diets of colonists and slaves we estimated the trend in the value of food consumed with 
which we derived decadal values from 1720 to 1800.  We first established upper and lower 
bounds on the trend and then settled on a most likely value.  Below we examine the sensitivity of 
the estimates of GDP per capita to these alternative values in the trend in the diet. 
 The lower bound for the trend would seem to be no growth in the value of the diet.  There 
is no credible evidence that the value of the diet declined over time, while there is evidence that 
military rations, the value of provisions provided to troops in New York and Pennsylvania, 
stayed roughly constant. 19   And, data on the wages of working class laborers in Philadelphia 
indicate that while there were short-run fluctuations in earnings there was likely no long-term 
                                                
18  See Mancall, Rosenbloom and Weiss (2113) 
19  Gallman, (1971, pp. 71-78), argued that the militia were ordinary members of society serving in the 
military for a temporary period of time, so military rations seem like a reasonable proxy for food 
consumption by the colonists.   
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change in the standard of living for those workers.  Real wages may have fallen at times during 
the colonial period, but were roughly equal in the late 1720s and 1800.20 
 The upper bound on the growth of the diet was determined by comparing our estimate of 
the value of the diet for 1800 (see Table 2) with evidence on the composition of the diet found in 
the Rules for Georgia, which specified in detail the provisions to be provided to persons on 
charity who were transported to that colony in the 1730s (Candler, 1904-16, vol. 3, pp. 408-9). 
Although this information on the diet pertains explicitly to colonists in Georgia, it nevertheless 
provides a point of reference for free colonists elsewhere.21   The specified diet included beef or 
pork, rice, peas, flour, beer, molasses, cheese, butter, spice, sugar, vinegar, and salt.  Moreover, 
quantities of each category of provisions were specified for adult males, adult females, children, 
and servants.   We have calculated that the weighted average value of these provisions for free 
colonists in prices of 1840 amounted to $24.22  Because this figure is approximately the same as 
the value other scholars have imputed to food consumed by slaves in 1800, and because it 
reflects an estimate of the food consumed by those on charity in a newly formed colony that was 
much less advanced economically than New York or Pennsylvania, we have taken it as a lower 
bound on the value of per capita food consumption for the average free colonist in the more 
developed Mid-Atlantic region in the 1730s. 
                                                
20  Nash (1979, pp. 392-94).  We extended Billy G. Smith’s cost of living index back to 1727 in order to 
deflate the nominal wages reported by Nash. Smith (1981, pp. 164-202). The 1800 figure was lower than 
that of 1727-28, but the average for 1798-1800 was about the same as that for 1727-28 
21  The little data available on the value of the diet for charity cases in the Middle Colonies do not yield 
enough useful information about the trend in consumption.  See, Philadelphia (1802) and Parker (1975, p. 
5) 
22  The diet for women and children aged 12 and over was 83 percent that of a male; that for children aged 
seven to twelve was half that for those aged 12 and over; and that for those aged two to seven was one-
third. No provisions were provided for those under two years of age (Candler, 1904-16, vol. 3, pp. 408-
09).  
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 Taken in conjunction with the given value of the diet in 1800 (see Table 2), this lower 
bound value for 1730 yields a very high upper bound on the rate of growth of the diet of 0.37 
percent per year over the period.  We think this rate of growth is implausibly high because the 
base year value of the diet implies that free colonists in the Mid Atlantic subsisted on a diet in 
1720 equivalent to that deemed appropriate for charity cases transported to America. Although 
comparable data on eighteenth century English diets are not available, evidence on the value of 
agricultural production per capita suggests that at least on average the value of food consumed in 
England in the first half of the eighteenth century was considerably higher than the diet specified 
in the Rules for Georgia.23 Moreover, the recent estimates of relative welfare ratios for urban 
unskilled workers in the eighteenth century, indicates that "Philadelphia had the highest standard 
of living in the eighteenth century..."24 This is consistent with the Mid-Atlantic region’s strong 
attraction for settlers.  Moreover, such rapid improvement in the diet seems inconsistent with the 
evidence that the average height of native-born white males increased by only one centimeter 
over the period 1720 to 1800 (Steckel 2006, Series Bd653).  Such a small increase seems more 
consistent with a diet that did not change much over time. Thus the value of the initial year’s diet 
had to have been higher and the rate of growth thereafter must have been slower.  Beginning 
                                                
23 Allen (1994, p. 102) estimates the value (in 1815 prices) of aggregate agricultural production in 
England and Wales for 1700, 1750 and 1800.  Converting these figures to per capita terms using Lee and 
Schofield’s (1981) population estimates and then converting to 1840 dollars implies that the value of 
agricultural production per capita production 1700 was $31 and in 1750 it had increased to $39.4 (British 
cost of living data and dollar-sterling exchange rate data used for this conversion are from, respectively, 
Clark (2013) and Officer (2013)). Allen’s production figures are net of seed and oats used as livestock 
feed, but they do include wool, hides and hay, which means that they overstate the amounts of food 
available for consumption.  Nonetheless, it would seem that the value of colonial diets would have needed 
to be considerably higher than $24 to be attractive to potential English emigrants. 
24  Allen, et al, 2012, p. 877.  The welfare ratios measure the unskilled annual wage deflated by the cost of 
subsistence for a family of four, where the subsistence measure is predominantly food.  The Philadelphia  
ratio was 5 or higher  from 1725 on - meaning the average unskilled worker could have afforded a diet for 
his family of four that was five times that of a subsistence diet. 
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with the known value of the diet in 1800, if the trend rate of growth in the diet had been only 0.2 
percent per year, the implied value of food consumption per capita in 1720 would have been a 
more plausible value of $27, about 15 percent above the value of the slave diet.  Even so, this 
figure may still be too low to have induced as much immigration and natural population growth 
as occurred in the eighteenth century and thus its implied trend in the growth of the value of the 
diet of 0.2 percent per year is likely still biased upward.  Nevertheless it can serve as a more 
reasonable upper bound than the 0.37 rate. 25   
 We are confident therefore that the long term average growth rate of the value of the diet 
between 1720 and 1800 lies somewhere between 0 and 0.2 percent per year, and our baseline 
estimate is simply the midpoint of this range—0.1 per cent per year. 26  This trend in the growth 
of the diet was used to extrapolate the 1800 base year value of food consumed back to 1720.27   
We then deducted estimates of the import of food from both foreign nations and other North 
American colonies from the decadal estimates of food consumed to obtain the estimate of food 
produced within the region for consumption within the region.28   
 The components of agricultural output are summarized in Table 3.  Regional 
consumption of agricultural products and the related regional production comprised the bulk of 
                                                
25  In the online appendix, we show that the rates of growth in agricultural output per worker implied by 
different rates of growth in the diet indicate that 0.2 is a more realistic upper bound.  
26  We also assumed that the slave diet changed at the same rate as that for the average colonist. Because 
slaves were relatively unimportant in the region, averaging less than 7 percent of the population for the 
entire period and dwindling in importance over time, this has little bearing on the growth of GDP per 
capita for the entire population.  Had we assumed the slave diet had remained unchanged, GDP per capita 
would have risen slower by 0.005 percent per year. If we assumed the slave diet had risen twice as fast, 
GDP per capita would have increased faster by only 0.006 percent per year. 
27 As we show below the plausibility of our assumption about the rate of growth in the value of the diet is 
reinforced by the implied rate of growth of agricultural labor productivity that it generates. 
28   The construction of the time series on food imported from abroad and from other North American 
colonies is described in the online appendix to this paper, Tables A14-17. 
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agricultural output.  The production of food supplied over 90 percent of food consumed within 
the region during the colonial period, and amounted to 85 percent of total agricultural output.29  
The remainder of the consumption was supplied by imports from abroad and from other North 
American colonies.  The former supplied about 5 percent of consumption, while imports from 
other colonies accounted for 3 to 4 percent.  The share of consumption supplied by imports from 
abroad was higher after 1790 than it had been during the colonial period, and that supplied by 
other states was noticeably higher in 1800, but still food imports in total amounted to only 10 
percent of food consumption in the region.  In other words, the region supplied the bulk of its 
food consumption. 
Agricultural exports abroad and to other colonies appear to have been a positive force for 
growth over both long-term periods, with the per capita values having risen at 0.49 percent per 
year from 1720 to 1770 and 0.54 from 1720 to 1800.  It is striking, however, that it was the 
export of agricultural products to other North American colonies that was the more positive 
influence at times.  Exports abroad on a per capita basis rose at 0.36 percent per year from 1720 
to 1770, but declined at 0.07 percent per year from 1770 to 1800, while exports per capita to 
other colonies rose at 0.8 percent per year during the colonial period and 1.1 percent per year 
after 1770.  The latter were a smaller share of exports for most of the period, but by 1800 exports 
to other states were about equal to shipments to foreign destinations.  Although exports, both 
abroad and to other colonies and states, grew substantially, they comprised a much smaller share 
                                                
29   The rate of growth of food consumed per capita differs from the 0.1 percent growth rate we have 
assumed for the diet of free colonists because of shifts in the composition of the population.  The relative 
level of consumption of free adults is higher than that of children, and that of free colonists is higher than 
that of slaves.  Declines in the slave share of the population raise the weighted average and its rate of 
growth, while increases in the child share of the population lower the weighted average and rate of 
growth.   
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of the agricultural sector than did food produced for domestic consumption, amounting to around 
11-13 percent, except in 1800 when they comprised about 17 percent.  Nevertheless, in most 
decades there growth was strong enough to propel the sector’s output at a faster rate than that 
exhibited by the sluggish growth of locally consumed food production.   
Combining the various elements of agricultural production we find that agricultural 
output per capita rose during the colonial period at 0.18 percent per year, declined noticeably 
between 1770 and 1790, and recovered most, but not all, of those losses in the 1790s.  Over the 
entire period 1720 to 1800, growth in the per capita value averaged 0.07 percent per year.   
Output per worker fared slightly better because the agricultural labor force grew more slowly 
than population after 1790.30  Over the colonial period, output per worker in agriculture rose at 
0.19 percent per year, then accelerated slightly after 1770, and advanced for the entire period 
1720 to 1800 at 0.25 percent per year. 
These growth rates of agricultural output per worker are consistent with several pieces of 
evidence regarding the performance of the agricultural sector.31  One is the growth of output per 
worker in the early nineteenth century, which defines a likely upper bound on the growth of 
output per worker over long periods in the eighteenth century.32  A second is the productivity 
growth implied by changes in the length of indentured servant contracts, the modal value of 
                                                
30   The small decline in the agricultural share of the labor force reflects a very gradual decline in the rural 
agricultural participation rate of 0.07 percent per year, described further below.   
31   The online appendix to this paper contains more detailed comparisons of our rates of growth of 
agricultural output per worker with these other bodies of evidence. 
32   This point was made by Ball and Walton (1976, p. 103). There could be a decade now and then in 
which there was an upsurge in output per worker, but over an extended period of time the growth in 
output per worker in the eighteenth century could not have exceeded the average increase over long 
periods in the nineteenth century. 
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which suggests little if any gain before 1760 and some increase in servant value after 1770. 33  
And finally, our estimated rates of growth of output per worker are very similar to those 
estimated by Ball and Walton for Chester county, Pennsylvania, the only other estimate of output 
per worker we have been able to find that pertains to the eighteenth-century Middle Atlantic 
region.   Our estimated rates of change in output per worker – 0.19 percent per year from 1720 to 
1770 and 0.25 per year from 1720 to 1800 - are very close to the 0.19 percent per year rate Ball 
and Walton found for the period running from 1714-31 to 1775-90. 34  Overall, we think these 
comparisons indicate that our implied rates of growth of output per worker are very reasonable 
and lend credence to our assumption that the value of the diet rose at 0.1 percent per year and to 
our estimates of agricultural output.  
 
Estimation of Sectoral Shifts and non-Agricultural Labor Productivity 
In addition to our conjecture about the rate of growth of the value of the diet, which is 
embedded in the resulting estimates of output per worker in agriculture, our estimates of GDP 
per capita depend on two other time series; the agricultural share of the labor force and non-
agricultural output per worker.  Changes in the latter influence directly overall output per worker, 
and, since the level of nonagricultural output per worker is greater than that in agriculture, 
redistribution of labor between sectors indirectly affects overall output per worker.  
                                                
33  Grubb (1992, pp. 181-82 and 202-25) argues that the mode is the superior measure of changes in the 
contract length and the value of adult servants because the mean values were influenced by yearly 
fluctuations in the age structure of emigrant servants. 
34 Ball and Walton, (1976,pp. 109-113, Table 3).  In the online appendix we show that even over shorter 
time periods our rates of growth are very similar to those they found.  The growth of agricultural output 
per worker in the region over this long term also compares favorably with our estimate for the Lower 
South.  For that region we estimated that output per worker rose at 0.22 percent per year from 1720 to 
1800.  Mancall, Rosenbloom and Weiss (2003, p. 403). 
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Estimates of the agricultural share of the labor force are based on two factors; changes in 
the urban-rural composition of the population and the rate at which the agricultural share of the 
rural population changed over time.  Due to the growing importance of New York and 
Philadelphia to both trans-Atlantic and regional trade, the urban population of the Mid Atlantic 
region increased more than eight-fold between 1720 and 1800.  However, reflecting the region’s 
bountiful agricultural opportunities, total regional population grew even more quickly: rising by 
a factor of nearly 14.  As a result, the urban share of population fell from 16.5 percent in 1720 to 
9.8 percent in 1800.35  Because the agricultural share of the urban labor force was so much 
smaller than that of the rural areas, this shift worked to increase the agricultural share of the 
region’s labor force.36    
Offsetting the relative decline in the population of the largest cities was the growth of 
non-agricultural employment in rural areas and small towns.  Based on data from Ball and 
Walton (1976) for Chester County, PA we have estimated a decline in the rural agricultural 
participation rate of 0.07 percent per year, which reduced the agricultural share of the rural labor 
force from 0.85 in 1720 to 0.77 in 1800. Taken together, the decline in the urban population 
share and the relative shift of rural labor out of agriculture resulted in the long-run in a nearly 
stable sectoral distribution of the labor force.  Between 1720 and 1740 the agricultural share of 
the labor force increased from 0.71 to 0.74, and then, as urban population growth kept pace with 
growth in rural areas, the farm share fell through the end of the century, reaching 0.70 by 1800.  
                                                
35 Lindert and Williamson (2013, p. 755) attribute the decline of the urban population share in the last 
quarter of the century to the negative effects of the Revolution and independence on urban occupations. 
36   If the urban share of the population had remained constant at 16.5 percent from 1720 onward, the 
agricultural share of the region’s labor force would have been lower by 2 to 5 percentage points.  
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 Because the shift into the more productive nonagricultural sector was so small  it had very little 
impact on output per worker and output per capita, even though nonagricultural output per 
worker was nearly three times that in agriculture.   
 Although the shift seems small given that nonagricultural output per worker was three 
times that in agriculture, it is not entirely puzzling. It reflects to a large degree the well 
documented decline in the urban share of the population.  Urban population had increased 
continually throughout the colonial period, but at a slower rate than the rural population, 
reflecting the abundance of land and its low cost relative to that for capital and labor (McCusker 
and Menard, 1985, chap. 15).  During the Revolutionary War and the turmoil of the 
Confederation period, the urban population continued to grow more slowly than the rural 
population, but in the closing decade of the century it grew more quickly; the urban share of the 
population rose by 1.5 percentage points and the nonagricultural share of labor force increased 
by 1.8 percentage points during the 1790s.   
A shift out of agriculture during the colonial period was held in check in part because 
entry into nonagricultural industries was not completely free.  British mercantile policies had put 
restrictions on the development of manufacturing in the colonies, and both the British 
government and the government of individual colonies restricted entry by granting monopolies to 
some manufacturing and service industries (Baldwin, 1903; McCusker and Menard, 1985, pp. 
342-45). 37 The nonagricultural industries that developed were predominantly those that 
processed agricultural goods and those that facilitated the export of some of those products.  The 
latter group, which included transportation, trade, and finance, would have been the locus of the 
high nonagricultural output per worker values, especially those located in Philadelphia and New 
York. 38   Given the scale and capital intensity of those firms, entry into these industries would 
not have been easy, and they were not the sort of industry with unlimited possibilities for 
                                                
37  McCusker and Menard (1985, p. 309) argue that the restrictions on manufacturing were not as effective 
as relative factor prices and the comparative advantage in agriculture. 
38  See Gallman and Weiss, 1969, Tables 7 and 8 for evidence of the relatively high output per worker 
ratios in transportation, finance and trade in the nineteenth century. 
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expansion of employment.39 In other words, growth of the nonagricultural industries could not 
have done much more than parallel that of the farm sector, at least not until the upsurge in the 
export and re-export trade in the1790s.   
Given the smaller share of the non-agricultural labor force in the economy, it would be 
difficult for any growth in labor productivity within this sector to have exerted much influence 
on the growth rate of the overall economy.  In any event, there appears to have been very little 
increase in non-agricultural labor productivity prior to 1800.     Evidence on the wages of urban 
professionals and skilled craft workers is more limited, but Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson 
(2011, p. 26) find that both the share of these more skilled workers and their relative pay 
declined in the years between the American Revolution and 1800. Similarly, Billy Smith’s 
(1981, pp. 195, 199) estimates of the real wages of Philadelphia tailors and cordwainers—two of 
the most numerous groups of urban craft workers—from 1762 through 1800, reveal that their 
earnings declined relative to the urban unskilled. Given that real wages for urban unskilled 
workers in Philadelphia showed little long-run trend, as we showed earlier, skilled wages must 
have fallen and nonagricultural output per worker could not have risen by very much, if at all.  
 Our index of nonagricultural output per worker is based on data for urban unskilled 
workers.  We combined the evidence on wages for Philadelphia laborers from Nash (1979) for 
1727 to 1775 with that from Smith (1981) for 1751 to 1800, and then deflated these by an 
estimate of the cost of living to arrive at an estimate of real wages.40  We used five-year averages 
                                                
39  According to Harrington (1935, p. 53) “In New York no business of any importance seems to have 
rested on a capital investment of less than £2,000” which was a considerable amount at that time.  
Doerflinger (1987, p. 57) argues it “was not very difficult to enter Philadelphia’s merchant community,” 
but he appears to be talking about smaller retail merchants, not only the larger merchants engaged in 
wholesale and international trade, and even then it required contacts, capital and experience. 
40  We would have preferred to deflate nominal wages by the price of whatever output the workers were 
producing, but have not found a satisfactory series.   One possibility, the price of imports is exactly the 
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to construct our index of real urban wages.41  Comparison with our estimates of agricultural labor 
productivity show that non-agricultural labor output per worker grew more slowly between 1720 
and 1770 and 1720 to 1800.  After 1770, however, nonagricultural output per worker fared 
better, having increased at nearly the same rate as agricultural labor productivity from 1770 to 
1800, and growing much faster from 1791 to 1800.42   
 
Economic Growth in the Mid Atlantic Region: The Baseline Conjectures  
We can now turn to the result of interest, the growth of real GDP per capita.  Our baseline 
estimates of real GDP per capita at decade intervals from 1720 to 1800 are shown in Table 4.  
GDP per capita advanced at an average of 0.13 percent per year over the colonial period and 0.07 
percent over the period 1720 to 1800.  Incomes rose rapidly in the 1750s (0.7 percent per year) 
and fell nearly as quickly in the 1760s.  While we are not able to construct estimates for 1780, 
the figure for 1790 indicates there was a pronounced decline in GDP per capita between 1770 
and 1790, which Lindert and Williamson label the Great Reversal, and which presumably 
reflected the effects of the Revolution and the disruption to trading patterns caused by American 
independence.  The 1790s, however, witnessed a strong recovery: GDP per capita rose at 1.98 
percent per year and made up almost all the gains that had been lost in the 20 years preceding 
1790.   
                                                                                                                                                       
wrong series because it measures prices of products not produced in the colonies.  Our deflator, although 
not ideal, is heavily weighted by the price of flour (40 percent), which was one of the more important 
manufactured products.   
41  We estimated the index for 1720 by assuming it had changed at the same rate from 1720 to 1725 as it 
had from 1725 to 1730. 
42 The absence of progress in non-agricultural labor productivity appears to be consistent with most of the 
recent research on British wages during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, which find that real 
wages did not begin to increase until after 1800.  See especially, Clark (2005) and Allen (2007). 
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 These swings in our estimates of per capita income reflect primarily fluctuations in labor 
productivity in the non-agricultural sector.43  As Table 4 reveals, our index of non-agricultural 
labor productivity (derived from the urban real wage series) rose considerably in the 1750s 
contributing to the rise in per capita income in that decade.  Similarly the drop in urban earnings 
between 1770 and 1790 was a major contributor to the drop in income after the Revolution.  In 
contrast, although agricultural exports were also quite volatile, total output per worker in the 
agricultural sector was relatively stable because exports made up such a small part of total 
output. In the 1790s the decline in the labor force participation rate pulled down real GDP per 
capita by a small amount, but this was offset by the positive effect emanating from a small shift 
in the sectoral distribution of the labor force into the more productive nonagricultural industries. 
In terms of our estimating series the post-1790 upsurge in GDP per capita is attributable 
primarily to increased output per worker: output per worker in agriculture rose at 1.4 percent per 
year between 1791 and 1800 (due primarily to increased exports), while non-agricultural output 
per worker increased by 3.4 percent per year.  To some extent these increases represent recovery 
from the distressed conditions that had prevailed during the Revolution and the period of 
Confederation.  For nonagriculture, the increased output per worker reflects as well the upsurge 
in the export trade and, perhaps especially, the re-export trade that the U.S. handled as a neutral 
country during war in Europe (See North 1961, chap V).  
We have also constructed a terms of trade index for the region, and used it to estimate 
adjusted values of GDP per capita.  The terms of trade improved considerably for the region over 
the course of the eighteenth century, having risen on average at an annual rate of 1.1 percent per 
                                                
43   As explained below, the volatility of the actual economy was likely greater than that shown in our 
estimated series. 
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year from 1720 to 1770 and at 0.96 percent from 1720 to 1800.   As a consequence, the 
purchasing power of the real exports per capita rose at 1.49 percent per year in the period 1720-
70 and 1.15 percent in the longer period 1720-1800, much faster in both instances than the 
growth of real exports per capita.  Despite the improvement in the relative price of regional 
exports, this adjustment had little impact on the growth of GDP per capita because exports were 
such a relatively small portion of the economy.  GDP per capita adjusted for changes in the terms 
of trade rose at 0.16 percent per year instead of 0.13 percent between 1720 and 1770, and at 0.1 
percent instead of 0.07 percent between 1720 and 1800.  Because this adjustment has little 
impact on economic growth, the discussion below is based on the unadjusted series. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The baseline figures reported in Table 4 rest on several assumptions that reflect our 
judgment as to the most likely trends in three variables underlying the calculation of real GDP 
per capita: the rate of growth of the value of the diet, the rate at which the rural agricultural 
participation rate declined, and the trend in nonagricultural output per worker, which we have 
assumed equaled that for real wages of nonagricultural workers in Philadelphia.  Here we discuss 
altering each of these assumption and show the impact of such changes in Table 5. 
As discussed above, the trend in the value of the diet was taken as the midpoint of what 
we argued were plausible lower and upper bounds on the growth in the diet, specifically 0.0 and 
0.2 percent per year.  Accordingly, we have calculated the growth of GDP per capita using those 
lower and upper bound growth rates.  If these were the only changes in our calculation, the 
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consequences are that the rate of growth of real GDP per capita would have been approximately 
0.04 percentage points slower or faster over each time period.44 
Our baseline estimates also rested on the assumption that the rural agricultural 
participation rate declined at the rate of 0.07 percent per year.45   It is possible that the rate did 
not decline at all.  Our reading of the literature on the extent to which colonial farmers engaged 
in production for the market offers no suggestions that farm households were withdrawing their 
labor from agricultural activities.46  On the other hand, it is possible the decline was faster than 
0.07 percent per year.  In the nineteenth century, the rural agricultural participation rate declined 
more rapidly, as one would expect given the higher levels of income and faster rates of increase 
in income.  In the Mid Atlantic region, the rate for those aged ten and over declined at 0.13 
percent per year between 1800 and 1840, nearly twice the rate we have calculated for Chester 
county.  
If the rate of decline in the rural agricultural participation rate were slower than our 
baseline assumption there would have been less of a shift in the industrial composition of the 
labor force towards the more productive nonagricultural sector which would reduce the growth 
of output per worker for the entire labor force, and the agricultural labor force would have 
                                                
44  If we allowed the diet to rise at 0.37 percent per year, the rate implied by assuming that the colonist’s 
diet in 1730 equaled that prescribed by the Rules for Georgia, GDP per capita would have risen at 0.22 
percent per year over the period 1720 to 1770. But this rate of growth implies that the diet in 1720 would 
have been equal to the 1800 value of a slave’s diet ($23.50). 
45   Ball and Walton (1976, p. 109-113, Table 3) appear to have assumed there was no decline in the rural 
agricultural participation rates, except for children, in their index of labor inputs per farm for Chester 
county from 1714-31 to 1775-90. The rate of 0.07 percent that we use is a weighted average of the decline 
in the child participation rate and constancy in the rate for adults implicit in their estimates. 
46  See Rothenberg (1992); Henretta (1978); and Kulikoff (1979).  Some household members may have 
left agriculture to seek work in nearby cities, but that effect is captured in our conjectures because the 
agricultural share of the labor force changes with urbanization. 
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increased faster which would reduce the rate of growth of output per worker in agriculture.  If, 
on the other hand, the rate of decline were faster, the rates of growth of output per worker in 
agriculture and in total for the region would have risen faster than in the baseline case.  As can be 
seen in Table 5 the differences are of the same order of magnitude as those found when we 
altered the rate of growth of the diet.  If we assumed there was no decline in the rural agricultural 
participation rate, GDP per capita would have grown more slowly by 0.08 percent per year; if we 
doubled the rate of decline, then GDP per capita would have increased faster by 0.08 percent per 
year.   
If we alter the assumption about changes in both of these variables simultaneously, the 
changes in real GDP per capita are altered that much more.  When both variables are allowed to 
change more slowly, real GDP per capita would have grown at 0.12 percent less per year; if both 
variables had increased faster, then real GDP per capita would have increased faster by another 
0.12 percent per year.  In the latter case, economic growth during the colonial period would have 
been about 0.26 percent per year, and somewhat slower (0.19 percent per year) over the longer 
1720 to 1800 period.  The plausibility of these rates of growth, however, is questionable for two 
reasons.  First this result implies that the value of the colonist’s diet in 1720 was equal that 
consumed by a slave in 1800.  It seems dubious that migration into the region would have been 
as fast as it was if the biggest component of the average standard of living was not much better 
than that of a slave.  Second, the results imply that agricultural output per worker increased on 
average over a period of 80 years at a rate in excess of that found for the first half of the 
nineteenth century (0.25 percent per year).47  It seems very unlikely that small-scale farmers in 
                                                
47  The rate of growth was 0.25 percent per year from 1800 to 1850, slightly faster for the period 1800 to 
1840 (0.34 percent per year).  Weiss (1994, Table 1.4) and underlying worksheets. 
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the 18th century could have made as much or more progress than their nineteenth-century 
counterparts at a time when there were fewer technical advances, and little means--such as farm 
periodicals that arose in the 19th century--of diffusing knowledge about such advances 
throughout the region.  
The third assumption of note, that the rate of change in non-agricultural output per 
worker could be approximated by changes in real wages of workers in Philadelphia, resulted in 
very little increase in nonagricultural output per worker over the colonial period.   Output per 
worker in nonagriculture rose quite rapidly from 1720 to 1740, then declined sharply in the 
1740s, rose again in the following decade and then fell once more in the 1760s. Overall there 
was virtually no change (0.02 percent per year) over the colonial period.  Nonagricultural output 
per worker fell between 1770 and 1790, but then rose sharply during the 1790s with the result 
that the 1800 value was about 10 percent above that in 1720.  Over the whole period 1720 to 
1800 nonagricultural output per worker rose at 0.12 percent per year, half the rate of growth we 
estimated for agriculture.  As a result, the relative productivity of non-agricultural to agricultural 
labor declined slightly at 0.17 percent per year from 1720-70 and 0.13 from 1720 to 1800, or put 
another way the ratio of nonagricultural output per worker to that for agricultural (k) fell from 
3.1 in 1720 to 2.8 in 1770 and 1800. If instead of relying on the direct evidence about real wages 
we made an alternative assumption that the value of k had remained constant, as had been 
assumed by David (1967) and Weiss (1992 and 1994) in their conjectures for portions of the 
early nineteenth century, the rate of growth of GDP per capita would have been faster by 0.08 
percent per year from 1720-70 and 0.06 from 1720 to 1800. 
In summary, reasonable changes in the three key underlying series would change the 
growth of GDP per capita by fairly small amounts.  However, in none of the alternatives we have 
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considered did the annual rate of growth rise to 0.3 percent per year.  Nevertheless, the Mid 
Atlantic region experienced positive long-term growth.  In our best estimate the colonial 
economy advanced on a per capita basis at 0.13 percent per year, with some sharper advances 
having occurred in the 1740s and 1750s.  The economy took a big hit during the Revolution and 
the Period of Confederation, but recovered so well after 1791 that despite the turmoil of the 
1770-90 period the average rate of growth for the entire period 1720 to 1800 was only slower 
than that for the period before 1770.  
Our series shows a smoother time path than likely occurred because we are unable to 
measure most of the short-run fluctuations in agricultural production and shelter services.  
Lacking direct evidence we were obliged to assume that changes in several of the largest 
components of GDP were based on linear trends in underlying components.  Food production, 
for example, was based on the assumption that the value of the diet, and thus food consumption, 
increased at a constant rate over time. Only for agricultural exports could we measure year-to-
year fluctuations.  And, the value of shelter services was based on a constant rate of the annual 
flow of rental services being produced by the stock of dwellings.  Because of these sorts of 
assumptions, there is likely less variation in our GDP per capita series than actually took place.   
In our series, deviations of GDP per capita from the long-term trend originated for the most part 
from fluctuations in the value of exports and from changing urban labor market conditions.  
Although the export series reveals substantial fluctuations from year to year, we do not think 
those variations capture accurately or completely the variation in GDP or GDP per capita. 48  
                                                
48  Some fluctuation in exports, agricultural output, and thus the economy as a whole, reflected 
variations in rainfall.  The Palmer Drought Severity Index, which provides annual measures of the 
fluctuation in net moisture available to plants and trees, suggests the region experienced considerable 
climatic variation and likely suffered through a number of poor crop years as well as an equal number of 
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Even though our series is undoubtedly too stable, it still suggests that short-run fluctuations in 
economic activity were relatively pronounced for the economy of the Mid Atlantic region. 
 
Interpretation 
What do our estimates of economic growth for the Mid-Atlantic have to say about the 
region’s economic performance?  First, these estimates allow us to put this region’s performance 
in perspective.  The region turned in a better performance than was found for the colonies and 
states of the Lower South, the only other region for which we have made comparable estimates.49  
For the Lower South, we estimated that real GDP per capita declined slightly – by 0.03 percent 
per year from 1720 to 1770 and 0.02 percent per year from 1720 to 1800.50  There is little doubt 
that the Middle Colonies experienced noticeably faster economic growth than the Lower South.   
Second, our estimates imply that the prevailing wisdom about the rate of growth in North 
America before 1800 needs to be reconsidered.  Our baseline estimates are well below the 
estimates of the region’s growth suggested by Egnal (1998) and McCusker (2006).51 Although 
                                                                                                                                                       
bountiful years.  Changes in moisture may also have influenced the trend in output, although the effect 
would appear to have been small.  See the online appendix to this paper for more detailed discussion. 
49  Per capita GDP increased in the Mid Atlantic at roughly the same rates as Mancall and Weiss found for 
all the colonies together (1999). 
50  Mancall, Rosenbloom, and Weiss (2003).  The poor performance of the Lower South reflects in part 
the decline in exports per capita, which fell at 0.04 percent per year from 1720 to 1770 and 0.6 percent 
from 1720 to 1800.  Another important source of the decline in GDP per capita was the changing 
composition of the region’s population, namely a continual increase in the share of the population under 
the age of 10 and an increase in the free share of the population.  These shifts kept the labor force 
participation rate from rising for most of the period and eventually pushing it down, especially after 1770.  
If nothing else had changed, this phenomenon alone would have reduced GDP per capita by 0.04 percent 
per year between 1720 and 1770 and by 0.27 percent per year between 1720 and 1800.  
51 The rate of growth we estimate for the Middle colonies from 1720 to 1770 is well below the rate of 0.6 
percent that Egnal estimated for the Northern colonies for the period 1713-75.  It is possible that these 
two disparate rates are consistent with each other, but given the 0.13 rate of growth we estimate for the 
Middle colonies it would require that New England’s rate of growth be quite high – roughly 1.0 percent 
 
 
 
29 
the upper bound of our estimates is only slightly below the lower rate of growth of 0.3 percent 
per year that McCusker assumed for the colonies as a whole, it is well below the higher rate of 
0.6 percent per year.   Moreover, in view of what the conjectural estimating equation implies 
about the sources of growth, the Mid Atlantic region could have achieved a growth rate in the 
range advocated by McCusker for the colonies only if agricultural labor productivity had 
increased much faster than we have assumed.52  In combination with our earlier estimates for the 
Lower South, the estimates reported here suggest that the plausible range of rates of growth for 
the colonies as a whole needs to be revised downward.53  
Third, the relative performance of the colonies in the Mid Atlantic regions and the Lower 
South also brings into question the importance of exports as an engine of growth in colonial 
America.  In neither region did exports comprise a substantial portion of the economy, falling 
well short of the 25 to 30 percent share that McCusker (1999) thought it accounted for. In the 
Middle Colonies exports made up roughly 7 percent of GDP, and the per capita value grew 
around 0.36 percent per year during the colonial period, somewhat faster than GDP per capita.54   
In the Lower South, exports figured more prominently, but still did not exceed 14 percent of 
                                                                                                                                                       
per year - in order to bring up the Northern region’s weighted average to 0.6 percent.  More notably, our 
estimated rate of growth is very far below the 1.6 percent figure that McCusker estimated for 
Pennsylvania for the period 1720 to 1774.  This would seem to indicate that the behavior of exports to 
England, which is the evidence on which he based his estimate, is not a good measure of economic 
growth more generally 
52 More rapid growth in agricultural labor productivity would imply growth rates greater than recorded in 
the early nineteenth century, and would also mean that food consumption at the beginning of the period 
was lower than seems plausible. 
53 Given the population shares in the subregions, New England and the Chesapeake would had to have 
grown between 0.8 and 1.0 per cent per year to have the whole country grow in the 0.3 to 0.6 range. 
54  The 7 percent figure for the Middle Colonies includes both agricultural and nonagricultural 
commodities.  Agricultural products alone amounted to about 5 percent of GDP. 
 
 
 
30 
GDP in most years, and declined on a per capita basis at 0.04 percent per year, about the same 
rate as the decline in GDP per capita (Mancall, Rosenbloom and Weiss 2003). 
Elsewhere we have shown in detail that the ups and downs of the economy of the Lower 
South were not correlated with the fluctuations in exports, and the same pattern appears in the 
Middle Colonies.  That is, the decadal changes in exports per capita do not appear to be highly 
correlated with changes in GDP per capita.55   Perhaps more telling as regards the idea of exports 
as the locomotive of growth is that the Lower South, the region in which exports were supposed 
to have driven economic growth, fared worse in terms of growth of GDP per capita than did the 
Middle Colonies. 
Fourth, and finally, the evidence we have presented about the series that underlie our 
estimated growth rates suggests that, in contrast to the early nineteenth century, a number of 
conditions were less favorable to advances in living standards in the eighteenth century.  Unlike 
the early nineteenth century, when the labor force to population ratio was rising, demographic 
trends in the colonial era were either neutral or tended to offset rising labor productivity.   While 
slowing natural increase and accelerating immigration after 1800 contributed to a rise in the 
Labor Force Participation Rate, in the colonial period, the LFPR held steady for the most part.  It 
dipped in the decades immediately after 1720, but regained its starting value by 1770.  It fell 
noticeably after 1770, and for the entire period 1720 to 1800 changes in the participation rate 
served to reduce the growth of GDP per capita.   Likewise, sectoral shifts in the composition of 
the economy from agriculture to nonagriculture, which were a source of aggregate growth after 
                                                
55  Luckily so in some instances, such as the 1730s, when exports per capita abroad and to other colonies 
both declined while GDP per capita rose ever so slightly at 0.03 percent per year due to growth in food 
production and the value of shelter per capita. 
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1800, were of little importance.  The agricultural share of the labor force rose slightly from 1720 
to 1740 and then declined; the 70 percent share in 1800 was only slightly below the 72.5 percent 
of 1720, so there was very little positive impact on productivity arising from a shift into the more 
productive nonagricultural industries.56   
In the face of demographic factors, our conjectures imply that any improvement in living 
standards was dependent upon increased output per worker and the gradual accumulation of 
capital assets..  Based on our assumption of a rising level of food consumption, agricultural 
output per worker rose on average at 0.17 percent per year from 1720 to 1770 and 0.24 percent 
from 1720 to 1800.  Had the labor force participation rate remained constant and output per 
worker increased as we have calculated, then GDP per capita would have grown by about $13 
between 1720 and 1800.  Because the participation rate fell from .31 to .27, however, a large 
portion of this positive effect of rising labor productivity was offset.57  All of the decline in the 
participation rate took place after 1770, so that during the colonial period, the increase in output 
per worker accounted for most of the increase in GDP per capita.    
Most of the remaining increase in GDP per capita was generated by the growth of the 
housing stock and the resulting flow of shelter services it produced.  In other words, capital 
accumulation, at least in this one sector, was an important force contributing to rising incomes. If 
nothing else had held the economy in check, the rise in the stock of housing would have pushed 
                                                
56  As explained earlier, the absence of a shift into nonagricultural industries is not as puzzling as it might 
appear.   
57  The decline in the participation rate reflects the changing composition of the population that occurred 
after 1770, especially the decline in the adult male share of the population because adult males had a 
much higher participation rate than adult females.   
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up GDP per capita by more than $0.75 during the colonial period and by another $1 after 1770.  
That alone would have generated growth in GDP per capita of 0.07 percent per year.  
Taken together these observations suggest that the dynamics of aggregate growth in 
North America underwent a significant transition between the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries; shifting from an economy dominated by extensive growth and subject to significant 
short-run fluctuations, to one in which the sustained growth of living standards came to stand out 
as increasingly important.    
 
 
 
33 
 
  Table  1   
 Estimates of Annual Rates of Economic Growth per Capita 
 Over Long Time Periods  
 Publication 
Date 
 
Time Period 
Geographic 
coverage 
Rate of 
Growth 
     
Mancall and Weiss 1999 1700-1770 all colonies 0.05% 
Jones 1980 1700-1770 all colonies 0.4% 
Egnal 1998  1713-1775 all colonies 0.5% 
McCusker and 
Menard 
1991 1690-1785 all colonies 0.3 - 0.6 % 
McCusker    2000 1720-1774 all colonies 0.6% 
Taylor 1964 1700-09 to 1770-79 all colonies 1.0 % + 
     
     
  Individual Regions   
Anderson 1979 1700-09 to 1770-79 New England -0.80% 
Mancall, Rosenbloom 
and Weiss 
2003 1720-1770 Lower South -0.03% 
Egnal 1998 1713-1775 Lower South 0.10% 
Main and Main 1988 1650-1770 So. New 
England 
0.35% 
Kulikoff 1979 1705-1776 Chesapeake 0.40% 
Egnal 1998 1713-1775 Northern 
colonies 
0.60% 
Egnal 1998 1713-1775 Upper South 0.90% 
McCusker 1972  1730-1770 Pennsylvania 1.60% 
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Notes and Sources to Table 1 
     These authors did not all measure growth of real GDP per capita.  Some specifically described it as 
such, some as Gross or Net National Product or National Income, while others implied that they were 
describing change in one of these measures of economic growth, but the specific evidence they used was 
some proxy measure, such as TFP or imports.  
Peter Mancall and Thomas Weiss (1999, pp. 7-40) measured real GDP per capita using the conjectural 
method. 
Marc Egnal (1998, p. 43) measured per capita imports as a first approximation, “then checked against 
data for long term changes in probate wealth and value of exports.” 
Alice Hanson Jones (1980, p. 78) used change in wealth as a proxy for GDP. 
George Rogers Taylor, (1964, pp. 24, 437) examined a variety of evidence and provided an informed 
opinion about the rate of growth of income per capita. 
John McCusker and Russell Menard (1985,  pp. 52-57) estimated the rate of growth of GNP per capita 
based on estimates of the growth of GNP per capita for England current at the time that they wrote.  The 
lower rate of 0.3 percent was that achieved by England, which they argue set the lower bound for the 
colonies; the higher rate of 0.6 percent reflected their view that because the colonies had started out far 
behind they likely grew faster than the mother country.   
John McCusker (2000, p. 156, Table 2).  In the accompanying text he revealed his preference for the 
higher rate of growth of 0.6 percent per year. 
Terry Anderson, (1979, p. 253, Table 3 and p.255).  His estimate of minus 0.8 percent per year is based 
on his estimate of TFP.  If one used output per worker the rate of decline is only minus 0.7 percent per 
year. 
Peter Mancall, Joshua Rosenbloom and Thomas Weiss (2003, pp. 389-424) measured real GDP per capita 
using the conjectural method. 
Gloria L. Main and Jackson T. Main (1988, pp. 27-46) measured real wealth per capita. 
Alan Kulikoff (1979, p. 277) measured real wealth per capita in Prince George’s county, Maryland.  
John McCusker (1972, p. 155, fn 17) used growth in exports to England as a measure of growth in NNP. 
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Notes and Sources to Table 2  
  Population figures for the U.S. and the Mid Atlantic region underlying the calculations are from  
Carter, et al., 2006, Series Aa: 2769-71, 4779-81, 4943-45, and 5407-09.  The labor force figures are from 
Weiss (1992) 
The figures for GDP and its components for the U.S. in 1800 were taken from Weiss (1992).   
The GDP figures for the Mid Atlantic region in 1800 were derived by extrapolating backward an estimate 
of the region’s per capita income for 1840.  The extrapolating index for per capita income was 
constructed as the product of indexes measuring changes in the same variables that underlie the estimates 
of the national figures - changes in the agricultural share of the region’s labor force, changes in the 
region’s labor force participation rate, changes in agricultural productivity - and an assumption that the 
ratio of non-agricultural productivity to agricultural productivity remained constant over the period at the 
value established for 1840.  It was further assumed that agricultural productivity in the region changed at 
the national rate between 1800 and 1840.  The region’s per capita income for 1840 is based on the 
estimates of Easterlin.  (1960, pp. 97-98, Table A-1)  
Table  2
     Estimates of GDP and Components in the Base Year of 1800:  U.S. and Middle Atlantic Region
(U.S. dollars, prices of 1840)
    United States      Mid Atlantic
Non-Indian Population Non-Indian Population
Totals Per Capita Totals Per Capita
$000's $s $000's $s
Agricultural Output 167,772$      31.61$            47,712$        32.56$             
Food Production 149,966        28.26              37,615          25.67               
    Food  (consumption) 159,098             29.98 45,206               30.85
    less interstate food imports -                     -                        4,337                 2.96
    less food imports from abroad 9,132                 1.72                      3,253                 2.22
Agric  Exports Abroad 17,806          3.36 5,539            3.78
Agr. Exports to Other Colonies/States -               -                  4,557            3.11
Shelter 20,381          3.84 9,281            6.33
Non-Shelter NonAgr. Output 163,369        30.78 57,580          39.29
GDP (Narrowly Defined) 351,522$      66.24$            114,573$      78.19$             
  --------------------------------------------------
Labor Force (1,000s of workers) 1713.2 402               
     Agricultural 1262.2 281               
     NonAgricultural 451.0 121               
Output per worker 
     Agricultural 133$             170$             
     NonAgricultural (EXCL Shelter) 362$             476$             
Ratio NonAgric. To Agric.                 
Output per Worker 2.73 2.80
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 Agricultural output is the sum of Food Production, Agricultural Exports Abroad and Agricultural 
Exports to Other States.  Food Production equals food consumption less food imports from other states 
and from abroad.    
Per capita food consumed by free adults (those aged 10 and over) and free children (aged 0-9) in 
the Mid Atlantic in 1800 was assumed to equal the average of the national figures for those population 
groups in 1839, 1849, and 1859.  The national figures were calculated from data in Gallman (1960, table, 
A-2) and U.S. Census Bureau (1975, series U-215 and 216).  Food consumption per slave was assumed to 
equal 75 percent that of free whites.  These per capita figures were then multiplied by the population in 
each group in 1800 to obtain a weighted average value for that year. 
 We estimated the 1800 values of agricultural imports from other states by extrapolating forward 
the 1768-72 figures (described in the notes to Table 3).  An estimate of the region’s exports to and 
imports from other states was derived for 1790-92 by multiplying the 1768-72 value of exports per ton 
cleared (for exports) and per ton entered (for imports) by reported figures for the coastal tonnage entering 
the ports of New York and Pennsylvania, and inflating these to obtain the value for the Middle Atlantic 
Region.  The average per capita values of coastal exports and imports for 1790-92 were then extrapolated 
forward to 1802 in two parts, using figures on the stock of registered and licensed tonnage.  The 1791 
figure was first extrapolated to 1794 based on the gross tonnage engaged in coastal and internal trade.  
The 1794 figure was then extrapolated forward based on the enrolled tonnage and the tonnage of licensed 
vessels employed in the coasting trade in the states of the Middle Atlantic.  In both cases the extrapolator 
was a three-year average of tonnage per capita.  The tonnage data are from Carter et al, 2006, Series 
Df591 and New American State Papers, vol.4, pp. 453-55. 
Food imports from abroad were estimated by calculating food imports per capita for the US., 
converting to 1840 prices, then multiplying by the 1768-72 ratio of the Mid Atlantic's per capita food 
imports to those for the US.  We calculated food imports in 1800 as a share of total merchandise imports 
(Carter, et al, 2006, Series Ee 368) less re-exports (Mancall, Rosenbloom and Weiss, 2013, Appendix 
Table 8). The 1768-72 ratio is from, Shepherd (1970, Tables 1 and 2). 
 For exports see Mancall, Rosenbloom and Weiss (2013), the Appendix to that paper, as well as 
the online appendix to this paper. 
 For the free population, the value of shelter services equals 10 percent of the value of the stock of 
dwellings in 1798 adjusted for omitted values (Weiss, 1992, Table 1.2; Pitkin, 1967; Soltow, 1989; and 
Soltow and Land, 1980).  The flow was revalued in prices of 1840 by using the deflator for the gross 
rental value of farm dwellings estimated by Towne and Rasmussen (1960) to obtain a per capita figure for 
free persons of $6.34. We assumed that the average value of a slave dwelling in each state equaled the 
value of those dwellings omitted from the housing survey.  That value was calculated for each state as the 
product of the national ratio of the value of omitted dwellings to reported dwellings times the value of the 
reported dwellings in each state.  This gave a dwelling value per slave of $7.18 in 1800 prices.  Using a 
service flow of 10 percent and converting to 1840 prices we obtain the annual value of shelter of $0.97 
per slave.   
 Nonagricultural output is the difference between the total GDP and the estimates of Agricultural 
Output and the value of Shelter. This residual encompasses all nonagricultural output, except shelter.  
Thus it includes the output of fishing, forestry, manufacturing, mining, construction, final services 
flowing to consumers, the value of government services as well as investment spending.   
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Notes and Sources to Table 3 
The value of food consumed per capita is a weighted average of the value consumed by the colonists and that consumed by the slaves, and 
the average for the colonists is a weighted average of that consumed by an adult and that consumed by a child, where the weights are their 
respective shares of the population.  Children are those under the age of 10.  
               Food Production
Year
Food 
Consumed
Food 
Produced Abroad    
to Other 
Colonies Total 
Agricultural 
Output
Agricultural 
share of the 
LF
Output per 
Worker
 abroad
other 
colonies
1720 28.50 1.38 0.92 26.20 3.23 1.25 4.48 30.69 0.71 139
1730 28.89 1.69 1.01 26.20 3.47 1.35 4.82 31.02 0.73 143
1740 29.28 1.33 0.77 27.18 3.82 1.14 4.96 32.14 0.74 146
1750 29.82 1.35 0.39 28.08 4.12 1.89 6.01 34.09 0.72 157
1760 30.26 1.24 0.94 28.08 3.20 1.87 5.07 33.15 0.72 151
1770 30.92 1.54 1.49 27.89 3.86 1.86 5.72 33.61 0.71 153
1780
1791 30.99 2.22 1.27 27.50 2.07 1.34 3.41 30.92 0.72 150
1800 30.85 2.22 2.96 25.67 3.78 3.11 6.89 32.57 0.70 170
Average Annual Rates of Change
1720-1740 0.13 -0.18 -0.91 0.18 0.84 -0.47 0.50 0.23 0.20 0.26
1740-1770 0.18 0.49 2.24 0.09 0.04 1.65 0.48 0.15 -0.16 0.14
1770-1800 -0.01 1.23 2.31 -0.28 -0.07 1.73 0.62 -0.10 -0.03 0.36
1720-1770 0.16 0.22 0.97 0.12 0.36 0.79 0.49 0.18 -0.01 0.19
1720-1800 0.10 0.60 1.47 -0.03 0.20 1.14 0.54 0.07 -0.02 0.25
 Table  3
(US Dollars, prices of 1840)
  Less Food Imported 
from 
     Agricultural Exports
Per Capita Values of Agricultural Output for the Colonies and States of the Mid Atlantic Region
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We assumed that the per capita consumption figure for free adult colonists increased at an average annual rate of 0.1 percent per year 
between 1720 and 1800.   The per capita figure for slaves was assumed to equal 75 percent that of a colonist in every year.   
 The estimate of food imports from and agricultural exports to other colonies for 1768-72 comes from Shepherd and Williamson (1992, p. 
798, Table 2).  We calculated the implicit quantities of most food items, revalued them using dollar prices of 1840, then inflated their sum by 
dividing it by the share of these food items in the total value of food (in pound sterling) in the original data.  We calculated average value per ton 
of agricultural exports to and imports from other colonies by dividing the base year values by the average tonnage clearing and entering in the 
years 1768-1772, and extrapolated these values to other years using statistics on tonnage entering and clearing. 
Food imports into the Middle Colonies from Southern Europe, the Wine Islands, and the West Indies for 1768-72 are from Shepherd 
(1970, Tables 1 and 2).  Imports of food from Great Britain were calculated as 3 percent of all imports from that source.  The total import figure 
was taken from Carter, et al (2006, Series Eg452-455).   We calculated average value per ton of agricultural imports for three points of origin 
(Europe, Britain and the West Indies) by dividing the base year values by the average tonnage entering from these other destinations in the years 
1768-1772.  We multiplied these values per ton by tonnage entering New York and Philadelphia from  these three points to estimate the value of 
food imported from foreign countries.   The tonnage data are from Carter (2006) and Lydon (1967). 
Agricultural exports abroad include only those exports produced domestically.  The  figure for agricultural exports from the Middle 
Colonies to all countries in 1770 (Shepherd and Walton 1972, pp. 210-227) was revalued in 1840 prices and then extrapolated that  figure forward 
to 1800 and backward to 1720 based on tonnage clearing Philadelphia and New York.  See Mancall, Rosenbloom and Weiss, (2013). 
Total agricultural output equals the sum of food produced and total agricultural exports.  
The agricultural labor force is the sum of estimates for the white and black workers residing in rural areas, plus an estimate of the small 
numbers of the population in farming that were residing in cities.  For each of the two rural population groups, the agricultural labor force is the 
product of the rural population in that group times a rural agricultural participation rate.  The 1800 rural agricultural estimating ratios were taken 
from Weiss’s earlier estimates of the U.S. labor force.  We assumed those ratios declined over the period 1700 to 1800 at 0.07 percent per year, a 
rate derived from the labor force evidence for Chester county, Pennsylvania presented by Ball and Walton ((1976, Table 3 p. 109-113).  Their 
indexes of labor inputs per farm for Chester county from 1714-31 to 1775-90 appear to have assumed there was no decline in the rural agricultural 
participation rates, except for children.  The rate of 0.07 percent is a weighted average of the decline in the child participation rate and constancy 
in the rate for adults implicit in their estimates.   That rate of decline is roughly half the rate at which the free labor force aged 10 and over declined 
in the period 1800 to 1840 (0.131 percent per year).   The urban farm labor force was assumed to equal one percent of the urban population aged 
10 and over, the percentage used by Weiss in his estimates for the nineteenth century.  Evidence for Philadelphia in 1774 and 1780-83 ( Price, 
1974) provides some confirmation for this percentage.      
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 Table  4
Conjectural Estimation of GDP per Capita for the Mid Atlantic Region, 1720-1800
LF Part. 
Rate
Agric. 
Output per 
worker
NonAgric. 
Output (excl 
shleter) per 
Worker
Agric. 
Share of 
the LF
NonAgric 
Share of 
the LF
Extrapolated 
Value of Non-
shelter GDP 
per capita
Value of 
Shelter
GDP per 
Capita
1720 0.31 139.06 430.69 0.71 0.29 69.22 4.59 73.81
1730 0.30 143.25 495.71 0.73 0.27 71.21 4.44 75.65
1740 0.30 146.42 510.71 0.74 0.26 71.44 4.63 76.07
1750 0.30 156.93 458.98 0.72 0.28 72.61 4.83 77.44
1760 0.30 150.88 530.19 0.72 0.28 78.24 5.07 83.31
1770 0.31 152.71 434.32 0.71 0.29 73.35 5.36 78.70
1780
1791 0.29 149.72 351.21 0.72 0.28 59.49 5.97 65.46
1800 0.27 169.86 475.50 0.70 0.30 71.76 6.34 78.10
Average Annual Rates of Change
1720-1740 -0.23 0.26 0.86 0.20 -0.53 0.16 0.04 0.15
1740-1770 0.17 0.14 -0.54 -0.16 0.41 0.09 0.49 0.11
1770-1800 -0.43 0.36 0.30 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 0.56 -0.03
1720-1770 0.01 0.19 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.31 0.128
1720-1800 -0.15 0.25 0.12 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.40 0.071
 1720-30 -0.41 0.30 1.42 0.22 -0.57 0.28 -0.33 0.25
 1730-40 -0.04 0.22 0.30 0.18 -0.48 0.03 0.42 0.06
 1740-50 0.16 0.70 -1.06 -0.26 0.71 0.16 0.42 0.18
 1750-60 0.12 -0.39 1.45 -0.01 0.01 0.75 0.50 0.73
 1760-70 0.22 0.12 -1.97 -0.20 0.51 -0.64 0.54 -0.57
 1791-1800 -0.54 1.41 3.42 -0.28 0.69 2.11 0.67 1.98
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Notes and Sources to Table 4  
          The Labor Force Participation Rate is a weighted average of that for free males, free females, and 
slaves aged 10 and over.  The participation rates for each of the population groups are those for 1800 
(Weiss, 1992).  Agricultural output per worker and share of the labor force are from Table 3.   
            The input values (cols. 1-5) are used to calculate the extrapolated value of GDP per capita. The 
independent estimate of the value of shelter is then added to the extrapolated value to obtain the full 
measure of GDP, narrowly defined (i.e. excluding home manufactures and farm improvements). 
            The agricultural output per worker data are from Table 3.  The nonagricultural output per worker 
series is based on wages of Philadelphia laborers taken from Nash (1979) for 1727 to 1775 and Smith 
(1981) for 1751to1800.  We used five year averages to construct an index which was used to extrapolate 
the 1800 base year value of nonagricultural output per worker.  We estimated the index for 1720 by 
assuming  the index had changed at the same rate from 1720 to 1725 as it had from 1725 to 1730. 
           The per capita value of shelter in 1800 is a weighted average of that for the free population ($6.49) 
and for slaves ($0.97).  We used an index of change in the stock of dwellings to extrapolate the 1800 
figures backward to 1700.  We based the index on Jones's (1980, p.78) estimate of the rate of growth of 
wealth per capita between 1700-25, 1725-50, and 1750-74, and Gallman's (1992, p. 95) estimate of the 
rate of growth of the real value of structures between 1774 and 1799.   
It is worth noting that the 1800 base year values in our conjectures reflect the degree of market 
orientation in that year, a degree which is then implicit in our estimates for earlier years.  To the extent 
that the marketed share of output increased over the period from 1720 to 1800 our estimated rates of 
growth understate the increase of market-based GDP.  It is possible that the higher rates of growth 
estimated by others have implicitly taken this increased commercialization into account, and thus the 
difference between our estimate of growth and theirs would be a measure of the rate at which market 
orientation had increased.  (Grubb, 2004, pp. 351-56).  
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Notes to Table 5 
 See the text for a discussion of the different variants. 
For purposes of comparison, the slave diet in 1800 equaled $23.45; the rate of growth of agricultural output per worker from 1800 to 1850 was 
0.25 percent per year. 
Table  5
Sensitivity Analysis of Several Key Assumptions
Baseline Case  slower  faster Baseline Case  slower  faster Baseline Case  slower  faster
0.1 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.13
 Diet = 0.1 
AgLFPR = 0.07
 Diet = 0.0 
AgLFPR = 0.0
 Diet = 0.2 
AgLFPR = 0.13
var a var b var c var a var d var e var a var f var g
Real GDP per capita
1720 74$               76$           72$        74$              79$          69$          74$                 82$                 67$                  
1770 79$               80$           78$        79$              81$          77$          79$                 82$                 76$                  
1800 78$               78$           78$        78$              78$          78$          78$                 78$                 78$                  
Implied Rates of Growth of Real GDP per capita
 1720-70 0.128 0.085 0.165 0.128 0.043 0.214 0.128 0.007 0.255
 1720-1800 0.071 0.031 0.108 0.071 -0.014 0.152 0.071 -0.051 0.192
Implied Rates of Growth of Agricultural Output per Worker
 1720-70 0.190 0.090 0.280 0.190 0.120 0.250 0.190 0.020 0.340
 1720-1800 0.250 0.160 0.340 0.250 0.180 0.310 0.250 0.090 0.400
Value of the Diet  (slave diet in 1800 = $23.45)
in 1720 29.27$          31.71$      27.02$   29.27$         31.71$     27.02$     29.27$            31.71$            27.02$             
relative to 1800 
slave diet 125% 135% 115% 125% 135% 115% 125% 135% 115%
Assumed Rate of Change in the Rural 
Agricultural Participation Rate
Assumed Both variables Changed slower or 
faster than the baseline case
Assumed Rate of Change in the Value 
of the Diet
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